The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.



THE ROLE AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OF THE USFK IN THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

BY

COLONEL SAM-YEOL JANG Republic of Korea Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.



USAWC CLASS OF 2001

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20010622 047

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The Role and Command Relationship of the USFK in the Changing Security Environment

by

Sam-Yeol Jang ROK Army

Professor Donald W. Boose, Jr. Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

> U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:

Jang, Sam-Yeol

TITLE:

The Role and Command Relationship of the USFK in the Changing

Security Environment

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

01 April 2001

PAGES: 50

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In accordance with the changing global environment, the security situation in North East Asia (NEA) is shifting toward one of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. The Korean Peninsula situation continues to change rapidly. Presently The Republic of Korea (ROK) has initiated dialogue with nK in the name of 'Sunshine Policy'. The risks of unintended war exist due to the threat of a collapse in the North and peace can only be attained in Korea through inter-dialogue.

This paper analyzes the roles and command relationships within USFK and examines the four likely scenarios, or situations, for the Korean peninsula to meet these future challenges. They are all different in terms of the way unification comes about. But in each of them, even with a new mission and role, the logical conclusion is that the stationing of US forces in Korea must nevertheless be maintained. The bottom line is that the ROK military must begin to prepare for post reunification. Therefore, it must study the return of wartime OPCON issue as well as invest in developing theater command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence (C4I), planning and intelligence collection capabilities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABS	STRACT	iii
LIS	T OF ILLUSTRATIONS	.vii
LIS	T OF APPENDIXES	ix
THE	E ROLE AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OF THE USFK IN THE CHANGING SECURITY	1
I. HI	ISTORY OF THE ROK/US MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS	2
	COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PRE-KOREAN WAR ERA	2
	MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE KOREAN WAR	2
	POST KOREAN WAR RELATIONS	4
	COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE 1960S AND 1970S	4
	THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ROK/US CFC AND ITS COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS	5
	COMMAND STRUCTURE FOLLOWING TRANSFER OF ARMISTICE OPCON	7
II. T	THE ROLE OF USFK AND ROK/US COMBINED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS	8
٠.,	ROK-US COMBINED COMMAND STRUCTURE	9
	A STUDY ON THE STATUS OF USFK	11

III. THE FUNCTION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE USFK IN THE '00S14
THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA I: ASSIMILATION OF NK THROUGH
INCREASED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTACT15
THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA II: CONTINUOUS CONFRONTATION 16
THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA III : INTERNAL COLLAPSE OF NK16
THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA IV: UNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF WAR.17
IV. UNIFIED KOREA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES18
V. CONCLUSION21
ENDNOTES33
BIBLIOGRAPHY39

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1	- COMMAND RELAT	IONSHIP FOLLOWING TRANSFER OF	
	OPCON DURING	ARMISTICE	7
FIGURE 2	- ROK - US COMMA	ND STRUCTURE	9
FIGURE 3	- CFC/UNC COMPAI	RISON	. 10
FIGURE 4	- ROK/US CFC STAI	FF ORGANIZATION	. 11

LIST OF APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1: PRESIDENT RHEE'S OFFICIA	AL LETTER	23
APPENDIX 2. EXCHANGE OF NOTES FOR	THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE	
ROK/US COMBINED FORCE	S COMMAND	25
APPENDIX 3. ROK/US STEERING COMMIT	TEE	
THE 1 ST STEERING COMMIT	TEE MEMORANDUM NO.1	29

×.,,

THE ROLE AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OF THE USFK IN THE CHANGING SECURITY

After the fall of the USSR and the collapse of the Cold War regime, a new multilateral global order took its place with the US as the single remaining superpower, along with Japan, China and Russia. The general consensus is that a new type of security environment will also take the place of the old one. This is particularly important when change appears --- on the Korean peninsula.

In accordance with the changing global environment, the security situation in North East Asia (NEA) is shifting toward one of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is participating in this trend through active engagement with Russia and China, nations that were once considered threats during the Cold War era. It can also be seen in the present dialogues taking place with North Korea (nK) according to the Sunshine Policy. ¹

On the other hand, nK, with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent change in the political atmosphere, can no longer depend on old allies such as China and Russia to provide military support as they have done based on ideological commonalities. Russia has yet to establish a new treaty after annulling its cooperation treaty with nK, and China, uncomfortable with nK's brinkmanship foreign policy and the destabilizing effects this sort of policy has had on the region's security environment, is drifting away from the military cooperation structure it had with nK in the past. Therefore, although it is expected that nK will reach a limit in terms of developing and maintaining its military capabilities in the long run, in the short term it will retain superiority over the ROK in certain strategic capabilities such as NBC weaponry development and forward deployed ballistic missiles. nK also continues to retain the unconventional capabilities of its forward deployed forces and continues to commit acts of aggression such as submarine infiltrations against the ROK. These facts highlight the Cold War reality that still remains on the Korean Peninsula despite changes that are taking place throughout the world.

The expectation and concern that nK will someday collapse as its economy continues to falter, the changes brought on by its missiles and nuclear capabilities, and the ROK's own internal nK policy and reunification policy are all factors that continue to shape the ROK-US military relationship.

The United States is committed to maintaining its current level of military capability, which allows the United States to play a key role as security guarantor and regional balancer.² The United States will continue a forward presence policy, in cooperation with its allies, which

reflects its interests in the region and allows for adjustments in the U.S. force posture over time to meet the changing demands of the security environment. Today, the United States stations or deploys approximately 100,000 military personnel in the region. Of these personnel, over half are stationed in Japan and close to 40 percent are in the ROK. The United States will seek to continue and build upon bilateral and multilateral exercises with key states in the region, including the ROK, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.

This paper attempts to present a military oriented national defense policy blueprint that would be in keeping with the environment of international cooperation that exists today by analyzing the changes that have occurred in the combined ROK-US military structure and the command relationship therein.

I. HISTORY OF THE ROK/US MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PRE-KOREAN WAR ERA

Following the independence of Korea, the ROK/US military relationship was established in accordance with General MacArthur's Proclamation No. 1. United States Forces occupied the area south of the 38th parallel on 7 September 1945 for the purpose of accepting the Japanese surrender in that area. In the wake of this event, the US established a temporary military government that started to organize Korea's Defense Structure. On 5 December 1945, the Military English School was established. Subsequently, on 14 January 1946, the National Defense Guard was also established. On 1 May of the same year, the National Defense Guard Academy was founded. On 15 August 1948 the Korean government was founded and organized the Korean Armed Forces into 5 brigades and 15 regiments.³

In this way, during the US occupation period, the ROK/US had a unilateral, not a mutual relationship. The US exercised the authority to command and control and to organize the ROK Armed Forces. In 1948 after the US troops completely withdrew, a United States military advisory group remained in Korea to continuously perform military aid affairs.

MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE KOREAN WAR

On 25 June 1950 the sudden attack by nK caused a prompt US reaction. The US saw nK's attack as the first step of a scheme to communize the world. In addition, Korea was

considered as an important area to the security of Japan. The US, as a defender of Korea, also regarded this situation as a challenge and risk to the validity of the UN.⁴

On 7 July, the UN Security Council passed a Resolution concerning the establishment of the United Nations Command (UNC). The contents of this Resolution included;

First, all the troops and service support elements of nations providing assistances to ROK will operate under the control of UNC with the US taking the initiative. Second, the US is delegated the authority to name a Military Commander. Third, during counter nK operations, the UNC is authorized to use the UNC flag as well as each national flag of the countries participating in the operations.

Finally, the US is asked to submit a report with respect to the activities being conducted under the command of the UNC to the Security Council in a timely manner. Following this, the UN Command was established in Tokyo, Japan, and General MacArthur was appointed as the UNC Commander (CINCUNC).

The CINCUNC received strategic direction and guidance from the US National Command Authorities (NCA) through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In addition, the results of military activities conducted by the UNC were conveyed to the UN through the US NCA. This allowed the US to execute operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces. However, as Korea was not member of the UN and did not fall under the influence of the UN resolution, issues arose concerning the issue of OPCON. On 13 July 1950, President Seungman Rhee decided to transfer the rights of OPCON stating, "ROK will regain OPCON when it is needed by the ROK." On 14 July, President Rhee forwarded an official letter to General MacArthur concerning transfer of command (see Appendix 1). Included in this letter was the statement, "OPCON is totally transferred as far as the current adversary's status exists".⁵

Now OPCON was officially transferred to the CINCUNC, and General MacArthur, as the commander of the UNC, exercised OPCON of the ROK military.

This military command relationship was maintained without serious problems during the Korean War. This was due to the focus on active warfighting, the initial preponderance of US combat power and a generally weak ROK military capability. However, there were some disagreements concerning military policy and the exercise of OPCON, specifically, the issues of the penetration of the 38th parallel line, nK dominance, and the armistice. President Rhee countermanded General MacArthur's guidance and directed penetration of the parallel by the

ROK Forces. On 1 October ROK troops penetrated the 38th parallel line near the east coast. In the UNC Commander's view, this act both confused command relationships and violated the existing agreement.⁶ The ROK and US were of differing positions regarding the management of north Korean areas occupied by the UNC. The South defined its position that the South possesses the legal rights to north Korea. In this context, the South named an administrative supervisor to exercise administrative and police rights. The US priority was to conduct rapid and complete military operations. The US and ROK authorities also disagreed over policies relating to the Truce Talks and the provisions of the 27 July 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

POST KOREAN WAR RELATIONS

Following the Armistice, the US deliberated two measures to deter nK military efforts on the Korean Peninsula. One was the stationing of US troops in Korea and the advent of a mutual defense treaty stating that the US will not be a bystander to any nK act of provocation. The second measure was designed to ensure the continued established and recognized procedures required for ROK OPCON in support of the Korean government. OPCON had to be returned as the transfer of command conditions disappeared due to the armistice. However, in accordance with the ROK/US mutual defense treaty, the US had the right to deploy the US Army, Air Force, and Navy troops on the Korean peninsula. The US also had the right to unilaterally decide when to withdraw or reinforce US troops in Korea.

Following the conclusion of the armistice agreement, an international meeting was held in Geneva. This meeting ended without agreement regarding the peace settlement on the peninsula. Rearrangement of ROK and US command relationships was inevitable. To ensure the armistice agreement, the UNC Commander, who signed the armistice agreement, had to control the Korean troops. Therefore, the two governments negotiated an agreement between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and President Rhee, which remains the basis of the establishment of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command.⁷

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE 1960S AND 1970S

The military coup that occurred on 16 May 1960 contributed to the political challenge to USFK and to US OPCON of ROK Forces. This incident violated the agreement the ROK and US had maintained since the armistice, since the coup Leader ordered the redeployment of ROK Forces without CINCUNC's approval. Following this incident, a new interest and discussions were aroused regarding OPCON. In May 1961, the National Reconstitution

Supreme Committee and the UNC announced a joint communiqué. The contents are as follows.

First, the National Reconstitution Supreme Committee returns OPCON to the UNC Commander and the UNC Commander is to exercise OPCON in times of nK infiltration. Second, the UNC Commander directed the ROK Marine Corps 1st Brigade and the VI Corps artillery unit to revert to the forward defense forces.

Third, the UNC Commander discharges OPCON of the 30th and 33rd Reserve divisions, one Airlift Special Forces Team, and five military police companies and transfers OPCON to the National Reconstitution Supreme Committee. This communiqué partially abandons and limits the scope of OPCON of the UNC Commander. OPCON can be exercised during times of nK infiltration. For some units ROK retains OPCON to support the units' original mission.

However, two incidents occurred in January 1968 that caused significant changes to ROK/US military relationships. One was the nK's attempt to attack the Chung Wa Dae (the ROK Presidential residence and offices) on 21 January, the other was the kidnapping of the Pueblo on 23 January. The US reacted differently to each incident. This reaction influenced Korean perceptions of the US and caused conflict between the two nations. Most significantly the proposed counter-infiltration operations by the ROK JCS saw the US as proactive in refusing the ROK's request for counter-nK retaliation.

Korean popular attitudes worsened regarding the US, and the Koreans asked for the transfer of OPCON. Then in contact with ROK President Park Chung-Hee US Presidential Special Envoy Cyrus R. Vance sent a ROK/US Joint Communiqué for improvement of ROK military power on 15 February 1968. ¹⁰ This Communiqué contributed to some change in major command relationships. First, the ROK was given the authority and responsibility for counter-infiltration operations. Second, the ROK established Reserve Forces to form a civilian, government, and military total force posture. Third, annual minister-level Security Consultative Meetings (SCM) became a practical institution of "the cooperation and agreement" mentioned in the 2nd article of the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ROK/US CFC AND ITS COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

In 1978, a more effective ROK-US combined operations structure was established and a new chapter opened in terms of the exercise of OPCON and military cooperation with the establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). The ROK-US CFC was established in response to the ever-changing conditions on the Peninsula, in anticipation of an announced withdrawal of US ground combat forces, and in order to improve combined

operations capabilities. The background is as follows. First, the US recognized the ROK as a viable nation capable of defending itself. Second, President Jimmy Carter announced that he planned to completely withdraw US ground combat forces from Korea. Third, the US began to reduce the extent of UN Command authority over US forces in Korea, calling into question the basis for US OPCON over ROK Forces.

Of these three factors, the most significant was the second. President Carter announced that US ground combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons would withdraw within the next four to five years, and instead ROK forces and US air power would be increased. This was reflected immediately as policy in 1977. However, Carter's policy met with much opposition and criticism. Reports that the military balance between the north and the south had been broken led to the suspension of this withdrawal in July of 1979. Although the withdrawal order was suspended, the organization that was prepared to fill the void remained, allowing the ROK to gain from the withdrawal debate.

On 7 November 1978, in accordance with ROK-US Military Committee (MC) Strategic Directive #1, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command was established. (See Appendix 2) The establishment of the CFC provided for a formal establishment of ROK-US military relations, a backdrop against which the OPCON of forces could be returned to the ROK, and showed the world that the ROK was ready to defend itself.¹³

The biggest change after the establishment of CFC was appointing the Commander, Ground Component Command (GCC) as a Korean ROK Army four star General. According to the Military Committee and CFC minutes made in 1978, it is stated:

"Commander, CFC is a US 4 Star General. He has 4 positions as Commander of UNC, USFK, and GCC. One of his staff, on appointment, will carry out the function of a GCC staff. DCINC, CFC is a ROK 4 Star General and has a dual hat as Deputy Commander of GCC".

The reason CFC has a dual hat as the GCC Commander is because most of the forces of ROK/US CFC are composed of ground forces. Additionally, the CINC, as commander of Eighth US Army (EUSA) commanded the US 2nd Infantry Division (ID).¹⁴ Therefore, for a more efficient operational command in wartime, a US general was seen as more appropriate than a ROK general. However, since most of the ground forces were composed of ROK forces, having a four star ROK general as the GCC Commander would improve the peacetime war readiness posture. Therefore, considering that a ROK commander would enhance the wartime capability was a sound reason for the CFC Command and Control (C2) structure to be changed.

Accordingly, a Military Committee Meeting (MCM) was held in October 1992. Memorandum No. 2, which stated that, to fortify the capability of Commander, GCC in peace and wartime, a ROK four star General as the GCC Commander would carry out the mission and be responsible for GCC. In this manner, a ROK General as a GCC Commander could direct the staff composed of ROK and US generals, make a plan to operate a ROK/US unit, and have the authority to control combined exercises. This was an epoch-making event and this developed into the current ROK/US relation. Also, this was a very meaningful occasion that formed the cornerstone for future ROK/US defense structure establishment with the ROK as the lead, and the US supporting.

COMMAND STRUCTURE FOLLOWING TRANSFER OF ARMISTICE OPCON

On 1 December 1994, armistice period (non-wartime) OPCON over ROK Forces was handed over to the ROK JCS from the ROK-US CFC. (See Appendix 3) The primary reason for this was that a need had arisen to look beyond just simple deterrence and defense against the north to a long term view that involved the dynamics of the strategic environment. It was judged a necessary step toward the 'Koreanization' of the defense structure. The Ministry of Defense took into account the following two factors in proceeding with the transfer of OPCON. First, it considered the transfer of armistice OPCON as an intermediate step in phasing into the Koreanization of ROK defense in the twenty first century. Second, the guaranteeing of CFC's armistice mission of deterring war was also taken as an important point to consider. ¹⁵



ROK JCS: Initiate civilian/marshal operations

FIGURE 1 - COMMAND RELATIONSHIP FOLLOWING TRANSFER OF OPCON DURING ARMISTICE

The changes that resulted are detailed in Figure 1. Because the OPCON that was held by the CINCCFC was transferred to the ROK JCS during the armistice period, all peacetime patrol missions that used to be under the direction of the CINC were now put under the ROK JCS.

However, in order to maintain continuity between armistice and wartime, CFC was to receive reports concerning these activities. Second, activities such as the enhancement of military readiness, joint tactical training, combat readiness maintenance and inspection, unit movement etc, could now be conducted by the JCS unilaterally and no longer needed coordination with CFC. In addition, coordination was no longer needed for the ROK Navy to make contact with other nations or to depart the CFC's area of responsibility (AOR) in order to protect maritime assets and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Lastly, the ROK regained the freedom to take action against third nation aircraft or ships that entered into Korean territorial waters. ¹⁶

II. THE ROLE OF USFK AND ROK/US COMBINED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

After the Korean War, the focus of the Mutual Defense Treaty was to station US Forces in Korea (USFK) to react to the nK threat and infiltrations. As a result, a secure and credible nK war deterrence capability was formed. This contributed much to deterrence and stability on the Peninsula and in East Asia except during the discussions on President Carter's proposed withdrawal of US Forces.

After the end of the cold war, a plan to reduce USFK by stages was initiated by the US. But this plan was ceased as nK nuclear issues arose in 1993. The US then established a plan to station 100,000 US Forces in the Asian-Pacific region. Under this background, the roles of USFK are as follows.

First, USFK remains dedicated to the peace and stability of East Asia. The US plays a major role in multiple contingency situations as the world's most powerful force. Practically, USFK complements the ROK military by providing state of the art equipment in the fields of intelligence collection and early warning ¹⁸. In addition, the US provides augmented forces and a nuclear umbrella to deter nK's intent to invade South Korea.

Second, USFK contributes to the ROK economy by reducing Korea's national security budget. Considering the US war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA) ammunitions, equipment, materials, and operational costs and maintenance costs of billions of dollars, the opportunity cost is enormous. According to Korea Hearld, it is stated:

"The operating and maintenance costs for U.S. Forces Korea's (USFK) combat equipment have been estimated to be about \$14 billion a year. If the converted value of fighting power by U.S. augmentation forces to be deployed on the Korean Peninsula in case of war were included, it

would exceed the \$100-billion mark, according to the report issued by the Defense Ministry of ROK." ¹⁹

Third, USFK is a symbol of the ROK/US Security Alliance and it secures the stability in the region as well as enabling the ROK to maintain its current sovereign status. ²⁰ Regarding Korea's geographic location, the ROK/US alliance plays a role guaranteeing cooperative relationships with neighboring nations. This contributes to managing the process of unification on the Peninsula. Even after unification, this ROK/US alliance will be tightly associated with the prosperity and survival of the nation.

ROK-US COMBINED COMMAND STRUCTURE

Following the decision by the 10th SCM in July of 1978 to establish the ROK-US CFC, the ROK-US military command structure resulted on 7 November of the same year (See Figure 2). To summarize the command structure, CINCCFC receives strategic guidance from the National Command and Military Authority (NCMA: The NCA and JCS) of both nations through the ROK-US Military Committee²¹ and exercises Combined Delegated Authority (CODA)²² regarding ROK and US combat units in order to defend the ROK from external aggression during the armistice period. As CINCUNC, he receives strategic guidance and direction from the US NCA, is responsible for Armistice compliance and negotiations, controls the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom, and manages UNC personnel. The US Commander in Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) and the ROK services support/coordinate with the CFC/UNC and USCINCPAC has command authority over USFK in wartime.




FIGURE 2- ROK - US COMMAND STRUCTURE

The Commander USFK (CDRUSFK), as a subordinate unified Commander under USCINCPAC, has support/coordination responsibility to CFC/UNC, including the provision of US combat and combat support units. CINCCFC during wartime exercises OPCON over the combined forces including US augmentation once integrated through the respective component command. UN and third nation forces are put under the OPCON of CINCUNC who coordinates with CINCCFC. CINCCFC also has the authority to create and employ joint, combined or single service task forces in order to accomplish his mission.

The difference between the CFC and UNC is shown in Figure 3. The ROK-US CFC has the mission of defending the ROK but the UNC is responsible for armistice maintenance. With regard to command of military forces, the CFC has OPCON of ROK-US combat units with guidance received from the ROK-US MC, while the UNC has OPCON of UN and third nation forces under the command of the US NCA through the JCS. Therefore, although the two commands are collocated, they are completely separate legal entities and maintain a mutual support and coordination relationship. With regard to armistice matters, the CINCCFC receives direction from CINCUNC. Although they are one and the same in person, legally they are separate entities, whole and distinct from each other.

Command	CFC	UNC	
Basis	Agreement / Strategic directive 1	UN Security Council resolution	
Mission	Defense of Peninsula	Armistice missions	
Command System	ROK-US MCM	US JCS	
OPCON Unit	Designated ROK-US Combat Unit	UN Troops/3 rd Nation Forces	
Relationship	Support and Cooperation		

"CFC and UNC cohabit in same building, legally two different commands with one commander wearing both hats"

FIGURE 3 CFC/UNC COMPARISON

In order to understand the command structure within the CFC, it is important that we understand its staff organization. (See Figure 4) First, since its establishment, the CINCCFC has been a US O-10 (four star general) and the DCINC a ROK O-10, the latter being dual-hatted as Commander, GCC. The Chief of Staff is a US O-9 (three star general) and he is multi-hatted as the EUSA Commanding General (CG) as well as the Chief of Staff (CS), UNC. A ROK O-9 or 8 (two star general) holds the Deputy Chief of Staff position and each of the principal staff and deputy positions are "combined", meaning both cannot be of same nationality. This staff organization concept also applies to special staff as well and down to the O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel/Navy Commander) and O-6 (Colonel/Navy Captain) branch chief level.




FIGURE 4 ROK/US CFC STAFF ORGANIZATION

A STUDY ON THE STATUS OF USFK

President Kim Dae-Jung stated on the 6th of April 1999, "nK said USFK may remain in the Peninsula only as Peace Keeping Troops." In this event, studies and discussions evolved with respect to the status of USFK in the media, academia, and throughout Korean society that generated new interest on this matter.²³

And President Kim Dae-Jung stated on the 29th of August 2000,

"North Korea Leader Kim Jong-il said it is desirable that US troops stay on the Korean peninsula, and said he dispatched a high-level envoy to convey that message to the United States several years ago."²⁴

The official position of the Korean government regarding USFK is as follows.

First, USFK is stationed in Korea according to the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty. This is a matter between the US and South Korea, so discussions between South and North Korea, or US and North Korea are unnecessary, and as long as the nK threat remains in the Peninsula, USFK is necessary.

Second, when realistic progress on a peacetime system structure is obtained, all discussions concerning force structure and deployment will be possible. Presently, it will be possible to have talks on South and North Korea military forces and USFK, and this remains a standing point of both the ROK and US concerning four country (US, ROK, nK, and China) talks.

Third, it will be desirable for US troops to be stationed in Korea even after the unification of Korea to play a role as a stabilizer in North East Asia (NEA). We have to make it clear that USFK is a peacekeeping force. This means the current armistice agreement must be replaced by a peace agreement. The current UNC structure and function of CFC will then vanish. When this happens, the deactivation of UNC will be inevitable and the meaning and existence of USFK will be diluted.

Accordingly, nK seeks to neutralize USFK's ability further to deter nK forces, convert its role as a peace manager, and disrupt the basis of the ROK and US Combined structure. NK has officially brought up the withdrawal of USFK more offensively, and unofficially they have raised the issue of a change in USFK status. North Korea has also called for halting combined exercises and assigning USFK to the rear area in the name of Korea's policy to settle the peace structure.

The official position of the US on USFK is as follows.

Current US regional commitment is reflected in the 1999 US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region that states,

"US Military presence has been essential to maintaining the peace and security that have enabled most nations in the Asia-Pacific region to build thriving economies for the benefit of all."²⁵

And according to the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and the Congress,

"The US seeks a stable and economically prosperous East Asia that embraces democratic reform and market economics. Central to achieving this goal are the US's strong alliance relationships within the region, especially with Japan, Australia, and ROK. ... The US desires a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict resulting in a non-nuclear, democratic, reconciled, and ultimately reunified Peninsula, as well as the peaceful resolution of the region's other disputes."²⁶

The United States' vital interests and supporting security objectives would remain much the same if the Korean peninsula were unified—the US would still promote a "stable, secure, prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific community in which the United States is an active player, partner, and beneficiary." Moreover, a unified Korea will have even greater strategic value to the United States.

Unification will increase Korea's strategic power. From a geographic perspective, the Korean peninsula is the strategic crossroad in Northeast Asia. Unification will reopen the land bridge between Japan and Asia. The nation that is allied with Korea and has access to its surrounding waters will play a pivotal role in the exercise of power in the region. From a military perspective, the merging of the North and South Korean armies could produce one of the world's largest land forces, sizable naval and air forces, and most important, the elimination of an existing threat to strike Japan, China, Russia, and the United States, with long-range missiles armed with chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear warheads.

In any event, a unified Korea will have greater influence on regional relations than in the past. For these many reasons, maintaining a stable, prosperous, democratic, capitalist, and militarily allied Korea after unification remains a vital US strategic interest.

The Korean government must analyze and be prepared to respond to any nK attempt or provocation that could still arise.²⁷ The Korean government previously stated the need to negotiate substantial and concrete conditions for the settlement of peace and tension reduction on the Peninsula. The ROK Government's position is as follows: ²⁸

First, confirm non-aggression that the two Koreas do not intend to attack each other. They must move to evolve a regional security agreement amongst the neighboring nations in the region. Additionally, mutual military status will require a formal verification.

Second, to obtain sufficient conditions to reduce tension in the Peninsula, nK must stop developing and deploying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Also, nK must observe international laws by joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and International Atom Energy Agency (IAEA) as a member. After these prerequisites are satisfied, the South Korean government must respond as follows.

First, Korea must sustain its position for the USFK to be stationed in Korea as a force to restrain nK attack as well as serve as a coordinator in the North East Asia region. This makes an alliance between ROK and US essential. Additionally, it would not be in the best interests of the Korean government to discuss the withdrawal or change of status of the USFK before the United States mentions it.

Second, South Korea must be prepared for a long-term provision to respond to the changing security environment of situations expected to arise. For example, it must be prepared for the publication of a joint communiqué similar to that of the missile guideline that firmly states that the ROK-US alliance is still effective even after the cold war. Additionally, all partners must be well prepared for further changes in the ROK-US combined command structure.

III. THE FUNCTION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE USFK IN THE '00S

Up to this point, this paper has looked at the history of the ROK-US military command relationship as well as the security environment of the NEA and the Korean Peninsula. The landscape of the Korean Peninsula's security environment changes every day with most agreeing that the possibility of reunification has never been greater. In the words of recent article in the Korea Times:

"Although some progress has been made in inter-Korean relations, North Korea's military capability and military confidence-building measures show little signs of change. Therefore, we decided to keep the concept of a primary enemy intact," said Maj. Gen. Cha Young-koo, director general of the policy planning bureau at the ministry.

The concept of a primary enemy, a term usually referring to North Korea, appeared in the Defense White Paper for the first time in 1995. The ministry said it is placing emphasis on education, including the concept of a primary enemy, for soldiers to ensure that their

security awareness is not compromised. "The implementation of the South-North Joint Declaration, reconciliation and cooperation, and eventual peaceful reunification can be made possible only if we maintain water-tight defense readiness."

The ministry, however, watered down or even deleted some terms related to North Korea in an apparent gesture to spur thawing inter-Korean relations following the unprecedented summit. It decided to call North Korean leader Kim Jong-il by his official title, "Chairman of the North's Defense Commission" and redefine the engagement policy into one of reconciliation and cooperation. It deleted such sensitive words as 'brinkmanship', a word referring to the North's negotiation tactics, from its vocabulary. ²⁹

Touching on the U. S. reinforcement forces in case of a contingency on the Korean peninsula, the white paper said the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), a major source of U.S. reinforcement forces to Korea, envisages the deployment of 690,000 U.S. soldiers, 160 naval vessels and 1,600 aircraft. The TPFDD called for 480,000 reinforcement troops in the early 1990s. Currently, the U.S. maintains 37,000 troops in South Korea.³⁰

Therefore, in order to shed light on the uncertain future of the USFK and ROK-US command structure, there must be realistic assumptions on the reunification issue and the security environment of NEA.

Establishing a circumstance concerning all the variations that can arise in NEA and the Peninsula will be difficult to define and can be meaningless. A review of the region shows the following realistic and general assumptions. First, the World Powers will dedicate their efforts to enhance mutual cooperation and exchange prior to and during the unification era. Second, countries in NEA and neighboring powers will pursue peaceful coexistence in order to maintain the current situation in the peninsula. Third, the ROK-US alliance will be sustained before and during the unification period. These general assumptions exclude unrealistic situations such as the resurrection of the hegemony of China and Japan, or the worsening of relations between the ROK and the US. With these premises, what is reviewed is the status and role of USFK before and after the unification of Korea under four scenarios or "situations" as follows:

THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA I: ASSIMILATION OF NK THROUGH INCREASED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTACT.

In this scenario, economic aid by the ROK and US improves nK's economy and there has been visible progress regarding confidence building and arms reduction between North and

South Korea. This situation is the ideal precondition for reunification, a scenario that allows for peaceful coexistence and the north south coalition the current ROK administration is aiming for.³¹

In this scenario, the ROK-US combined military structure will become an obstacle to confidence building and arms reduction, and, therefore, will require some modification. However, until a peace treaty replaces the current armistice agreement, CFC and UNC must be maintained. Accordingly, so must USFK, but by changing the force composition to favor air and naval power over ground, it can shift its emphasis from that of deterrence of war on the Peninsula to that of a stabilizer in the NEA region. Therefore, the combined military structure must be so modified, and, according to the situation, peace treaties must be signed by relevant parties in order to establish the conditions necessary for reunification.

THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA II: CONTINUOUS CONFRONTATION.

In this scenario, the current South and North confrontation continues for a prolonged duration. Both Koreas face extreme differences in military and economic standing. The ROK has achieved a significant level of information technology and military modernization over that of nK. Under such a situation, facing North Korea's threat, ROK and US must maintain their alliance under the Mutual Defense treaty, a relationship such as the ROK-US Combined Forces Command Structure, and annual security consultations. In this environment, USFK must deter the hegemony of China and Japan and play a role to maintain the balance of power, as well as serve as a facilitator to deter the aggression and infiltration of North Korea.

Before unification, the role of USFK will be to deter war in the Peninsula as well as to play a role of balancing power in the region according to the NEA situation. The military relationship between the ROK and US could possibly change as well. With modernized information capabilities, the ROK would be able to conduct operations independently and retain the ability to fight if required. Thus, the ROK would have the initiative in terms of military command relationships and the US would be supportive to the ROK. The ROK would retain OPCON of its own forces during the armistice period, while the US retains OPCON of USFK. Additionally, there may be a request to review the disestablishment of CFC, but retaining UNC as an entity.

THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA III: INTERNAL COLLAPSE OF NK.

After continuous confrontations with hostilities and self-collapse of the nK system, unification becomes a reality. The destruction of the nK government situation will result in

unification. This self-destruction could result due to the occurrence of massive fugitives, civil war or national disorder. However, prior to self-destruction, a threat would exist due to the large number of military forces positioned along the border and the increased chance of provocation by force. This threat could be caused by Kim Jong-il attempting local provocation to overcome the nK national difficulties. Second, a partial provocation could arise, fomented by the hard liners of the KPA. Thirdly, nK overaction to dissidents and civil disturbances may cause contingency situations.

Thus the threat of war in this scenario demands the ROK-US combined command structure be responsive. If necessary, military operations will be executed to restore order and stability after the collapse of nK before unification can be realized. USFK will control the war or national disorder and further support the integration of the south and north militaries. The two Koreas may each play a role as a facilitator and stabilizer to the peninsula and NEA. But under the stabilized situation, the defense of Korea should be led by Korea and supported by the US. After unification, the role of UNC and CFC would be replaced by a security cooperation relationship.

When the nK threat disappears, a question arises as to the authority of a ROK and US alliance and the role of USFK. Unification allows USFK to withdraw as long as the alliance between the US and Japan is sustained thus precluding the rise of Japan as an aggressive military power. To be prepared for this, the ROK government should balance US and Korea's strategy to pursue shared interests. Also the government must be prepared to develop the current ROK-US alliance into a regional alliance.

THE SITUATION OF THE PENINSULA IV: UNIFICATION AS A RESULT OF WAR.

When war breaks out on the peninsula following a nK invasion, US troops will be directly engaged. Unification will then result with the collapse of nK. This situation provides the worst scenario; one that does not completely satisfy either the ROK or US. It is a situation that depicts a failure to deter war on the Peninsula. Inarguably CFC will win the war. It will be impossible for nK to win due to economic exhaustion and national power impoverishment. However, this war will cause both Koreas to suffer from extreme physical and mental damage. In order to minimize this damage as much as possible, both CFC and UNC may have to terminate the war early. To achieve this, a tight alliance between the ROK and US is required to stabilize the nK situation as early as possible.

CINCCFC will execute OPCON of the augmented forces additionally dispatched from the US and UNC nations. Issues are expected to arise due to the assignment of the GCC commander as a ROK general and the debated chain of command structure during wartime. For the ROK, a Korean GCC Commander is needed to maintain continuity on the issues concerning occupation of nK terrain, civilian affairs, administration changes, and other problems concerning post-war politics. The US will play an important role supporting the integration of south and north Korean soldiers. Also the US will provide support for the ROK armed forces to convert from a manpower intensive force to a technology intensive advanced force. To accomplish all of this, a ROK-US alliance is necessary.

However, after the end of the war and as the security of the Peninsula is realized, matters with respect to the command relationship of ROK and US forces will have to be addressed. As the nK threat vanishes and the armistice agreement and UNC become nullified, the current basis for the command relationship of ROK and US forces will no longer exist. Then the US will fulfill its role as a stabilizer in the Pacific region and NEA based on national interests. Now a new ROK-US relationship can be established based on mutually shared national interests. The US now ensures security in NEA. The ROK will offer active support to enhance the security posture of the Peninsula.

IV. UNIFIED KOREA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Unified Korea's stability and security will hinge on overcoming two sets of challenges—one internal, the other external. The internal security challenges will primarily stem from the tasks associated with integration—stabilizing the North, closing the huge economic gap between the two states, and melding two societies that have diverged for half a century. In every probable unification scenario, the task of undoing the damage caused by decades of communist oppression will require a large-scale, comprehensive, and structured effort that will require substantial military involvement. Initially, the military will be the institution most capable of establishing the stability and order that are prerequisites to reconstruction. The military will also provide humanitarian assistance and nation-building capabilities beyond those of civilian institutions, especially in the early stages of unification. Fortunately, the immediate external challenges are neither as pressing nor as daunting as the internal security tasks, except in the highly unlikely event of Chinese invasion. The removal of the North Korean threat will shift

Korea's external security focus to defense against attack by China, Russia, or Japan and to maintaining regional stability.

The close relationship between ROK and US military forces, unique US peace operations and humanitarian assistance capabilities, and the wealth of American experience gained in recent operations strongly suggest that US forces will play an important role at least during the initial stages of the unification process. It is also likely that Japan, China, and Russia will contribute significantly to the reconstruction effort, and Korea's skillful organization and management of external assistance will be a prerequisite for its success.

Organizing for reconstruction offers three general options: (1) a purely Korean effort; (2) an organization based on the ROK-US alliance; or (3) a multinational coalition under Korean leadership. 32 The cost, magnitude, and complexity of the task make it unlikely that Korea could achieve integration without external assistance. The second option, solely relying on capabilities available through the ROK-US alliance, is feasible, but not advisable. While it is unlikely that any of the regional powers would insist on immediate US withdrawal or seek to exclude its participation in the unification process, US roles and organizations are potentially contentious issues. For example, China may balk if the US were to assume a leading role, an inordinately large role, or employ combat forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel. China might even argue for an equal part in supporting the reconstruction despite lacking significant capabilities beyond its sheer manpower. The third option, a multinational effort under Korean leadership, holds the greatest promise for success. While the leadership of the United Nations (UN) or some other regional structure is possible, the nature of the tasks, lack of a requirement to separate belligerents, and, most importantly, the anticipated establishment of single government sovereignty over the entire peninsula suggests that the Korean government would lead the unification effort rather than an external international arbiter like the UN. This does not preclude UN participation, but emphasizes the central role that Korea is expected to play in all aspects of the unification process.

The composition and organization of a Korean-led multinational unification task force presents numerous challenges. By virtue of its long-standing alliance with the ROK, the size of its military presence, and the existence of an integrated ROK-US military command structure on the peninsula, the US will probably play a major supporting role in the organization. China, Japan, and Russia will also seek a role in the organization and, as with the US, the participation of each has positive and negative aspects.

These conditions suggest that the peace operation will be conducted by a multinational coalition operation led by Korea with a significant supporting US presence. China, Russia, and other nations from the Asia-Pacific region will probably contribute to the effort with troops, equipment, and/or money in accordance with their capabilities.³³

The organization would be a Korean-led multinational and multiservice organization, or in military terminology a "combined joint task force," with the mission of planning, coordinating, and conducting humanitarian assistance and reconstruction operations. The unification task force would fall under the command of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), the senior operational command in Korea. Ideally, a Korean general will command the CFC. If a US citizen holds the position at the time of unification, the Korean deputy commander should be in charge of the mission. The organization would remain in operation until the Korean government could form an equivalent civilian structure, achieve stability, and deploy sufficient civilian capability to assume military civil functions. Recent operations suggest that this would take 12 to 18 months.³⁴

The United States' extensive experience with peace building, humanitarian assistance operations and the existing integration of military forces in the ROK-US alliance suggests that the US would advise the Korean government in many areas. This advise includes, but is not launched to, assisting with planning and the development of the organizational structure to accommodate often ill-defined relationships among the numerous government organizations, non-government organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), international organizations, and UN organizations that would participate in the operation.

Although the US ambassador to Korea is the senior American in the country, the central players would be the USFK commander and his subordinate commanding the US component of the unification task force. And, US forces would provide a large number of liaison teams to ensure close cooperation and coordination between the multitudes of organizations involved in reconstruction.³⁵ Providing these planning and coordination support functions at USFK headquarters and within the unification task force headquarters would require a sizable contingent of US military personnel.

In addition to assisting the Korean military with planning and coordination, US military units would participate in the conduct of operations. The extent and nature of US participation would depend on how well the Korean government prepares for unification. Without time to train military units for large-scale peace operations and humanitarian assistance, the Korean government would lean heavily on US experience and expertise. On the other hand, if the

Korean government successfully engineers the soft landing it desires, then more time will be available to organize and train Korean units for the operation. The US military would still be involved, but to a lesser degree. Beyond advising their Korean counterparts, US military units could and probably would perform a large variety of tasks. One of the categories of tasks that the US military should not perform, however, are those related to restoration and maintenance of order and stability.

V. CONCLUSION

The ROK-US military relationship has been in place since Korea's liberation and the Korean War. A significant characteristic of this relationship in the past, the abnormal phenomenon of having one nation retain OPCON of another's armed forces was unchanged until recently. With the establishment of the ROK-US CFC, a system was established to allow the ROK military to participate in defense planning, and the naming of a ROK general as commander, GCC. Thus the foundation was laid for the eventual return of OPCON. Subsequent actions also included the return of peacetime OPCON to the Chairman of the ROK JCS.

The situation in NEA and on the Korean Peninsula is changing rapidly. However, despite the end of the Cold War and emerging multilateral environment, nK still refuses to abandon its brinkmanship diplomacy of using nuclear weapons and missiles and continues to maintain its regime by use of its conventional forces. Few believe this will continue indefinitely. Therefore, there is a need to prepare the ROK-US combined military structure for further changes on the Peninsula and in nK. Of course, as long as the nK threat remains, the alliance needs to be retained, and USFK must remain in its present size. But, as tensions ease and a peace regime is finally established, the function of the USFK must adapt along with its command structure. This is of even greater importance should reunification occur. Additionally, reunification drives the inactivation of CFC and the UNC.

In this paper, I have examined four likely scenarios, or situations, for the Korean peninsula. They are all different in terms of the way unification comes about. But in each of them, even with a new mission and role, the logical conclusion is that the stationing of US forces in Korea must nevertheless be maintained. The US also holds the view that in order to protect its interests in the region, a firm alliance with the ROK must be maintained. Changing the structure in response to new developments and cooperating on all issues therefore should pose

no big problem. The ROK government has recently announced its intentions regarding stationing of US forces in Korea and the US administrations have shared similar views. New agreements need to be worked regarding burden sharing, base usage, SOFA (status of forces agreements) etc.

The ROK military must begin to prepare for post reunification. Unification will not end the relationship between ROK and US. Instead, unification will create new opportunities for cooperation and teamwork between the military forces of the US and Korea in the continuing pursuit of peace and prosperity. Therefore, it must study the return of wartime OPCON issue as well as invest in developing theater C4I, planning and intelligence collection capabilities. The day the ROK and the US must begin coordination on issues mentioned above is not far off in the future.

Word count = 8,074

APPENDIX 1: PRESIDENT RHEE'S OFFICIAL LETTER

The Korean President Syngman Rhee to the American Embassy (July 15, 1950)

July 14, 1950 Pusan, Korea

Dear General MacArthur:

In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have need placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised wither by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to who you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent areas.

The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have jointed together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land.

With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal regard,

Sincerely Yours, Syngman Rhee

APPENDIX 2. EXCHANGE OF NOTES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROK/US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

Exchange of Notes for the Establishment of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command Korean Proposing Note

Seoul, October 17, 1978

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and ROK/US Combined Forces Command agreed upon between the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America at the 11th ROK/US Annual Security Consultative Meeting held in San Diego, California, on 26-27 July 1978.

I have further the honor to inform that it is the understanding of the Government of the Republic of Korea that the said Terms of Reference is an arrangement duly made within the framework of the Mutual Deference Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America signed in 1953 and paragraph 2 of the Korean undertakings as set forth in the Agreed Minute between the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters signed in 1954 as amended in 1955 and 1962 respectively, and that the said arrangement will remain in force while the Commander-in-Chief, ROK/US Combined Forces Command is a US four-star general who also serves as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of your Government that the aforementioned is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Minister of Foreign Affairs

U.S. Note in Reply

Seoul, October 17, 1978

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellencys Note of 17 October 1978, which reads as follows:

(Korean proposing Note)

I have further the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador of United States of America

APPENDIX 3. ROK/US STEERING COMMITTEE

THE 1ST STEERING COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM NO.1

ROK/US STEERING COMMITTEE

THE 1ST STEERING COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM NO.1

7 APR 1994

SUBJECT: BASIC AGREEMENT

On this date the ROK/US General Officer Steering Committee agreed on the withdrawal of armistice OPCON of ROK Forces as follows.

Basic Concept

ROKG will withdraw all the authorities related to the armistice OPCON of ROK Forces.

Through the ROK-US Military Committee, ROKG will delegate necessary functions and authorities to CINCCFC for deterrence and war preparation.

ROK CJCS execute the functions which have been executed by CINCCFC in support of CINCUNC Armistice maintenance.

Follow the Armistice Affairs Regulations of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC).

Support CINCUNC in response to armistice violations by the opposing side (with combat forces, if necessary).

The relationship between CINCUNC and Chairman of ROKJCS is cooperative and supportive.

Combined Delegated Authorities (CODA)

CODA is the authority to maintain readiness and to prepare forces to execute combined missions, plans or tasks. This includes the authority to give direction in the areas of:

- -Deliberate Planning
- -Combined Joint Doctrine Development
- -Plan and conduct Combined Joint Training and Exercise
- -Combined intelligence management
- -C4I Interoperability

(Scope TBD at ROK/US Interoperability committee)

CINC CFC exercises CODA or delegates it to subordinate commanders.

CINC CFC has the authority to plan and to execute the specific tasks assigned or approved by the MC, and has the authority to deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the assigned forces to execute that plan.

Details of CODA will be discussed at the sub-committee and basic concept and CODA will be included in revised TOR and Strategic Directive NO.1

Organization of Steering Committee

GOSC consists of Director, J-3 Plan, ROKJCS and ACofS C/J-5, CFC/USFK, and some action officers. GOSC fulfill practical consultation of OPCON withdrawal and reports the results to the MC.

Organize Action Level Committee chaired by Chief of Opns Planning Br. ROKJCS and Chief of J-5 Policy Div, USFK.

Organize 5 Sub-Committees (General, Operation, Training/Exercise, Intelligence, C4I) by representatives of ROK JCS and USFK/CFC.

Major Topics

Functions and authorities of CFC in armistice.

Responsibility of ROK JCS, relationship between ROK JCS and UNC for Armistice Agreement Management.

Timing of OPCON transfer to CFC and wartime transition procedure.

ROK JCS and CFC responsibilities, functions, and relationship for crisis management:

Command relationship

Combined Joint Doctrine/Training/Exercise

Combined Intelligence Management

C4I Interoperability

Format of Final Agreement

Other

Milestones

MG, ROK Army

Feb-Mar 94 : Sub-Committee discussion

Apr 94 : Amend basic documents (TOR. strategic directive)

May-Jun 94 : Amend related documents (regulation, policy, SOP)

Jun 94 : Staff draft report at Pre-MCM

Aug 94 : Test concept at UFL 94

Sep 94 : Make final report to MCM/SCM

Oct 94 : Final Agreement at 94 SCM

1 Dec 94 : ROKG withdraws Armistice OPCON

Shin, Yang Ho

Director, J-3 Plan ACofS, C/J-5

J.M. Myatt MG, USMC

ROK JCS CFC/USFK

ENDNOTES

¹ South Korea has pursued a policy of engagement, called the Sunshine Policy, toward nK. The three principles of this policy are: First, ROK government will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind that would destroy peace. Second, ROK government has no intention whatsoever of unifying the peninsula by absorbing the North. Third, ROK government will actively promote reconciliation and cooperation with nK. As the results of Sunshine Policy, South-North Korea Summit Talks was held in June 13-15 2000 and followed some meetings including Minister level meeting and working level talks. According to New York Times (27 September 2000, A-5), "South North Korea agreed today to a limited reopening of the demilitarized zone that separates the countries to repair a railway link that has been severed for more than 50 years. ... Getting these links open would be a big boost to the process of reconciliation. It would prove there is a willingness to work on common problems."

² William S. Cohen, <u>Annual Report to the President and Congress</u> (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense, 2000), 10-11.

³ Young-won Han, <u>The Establishment and Role of ROK Armed Forces</u> (Seoul: Korea Univ., 1982), 93.

⁴ According to Kissinger's <u>Diplomacy</u>, "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security." Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: A Touchstone Book Co. 1994), 476-477.

⁵ Ministry of National Defense (MND), <u>Agreements of MND</u> book 1 (Seoul: Committee of War History, 1981), 629-631.

⁶ Yang-Myeong Kim, Korean War History (Seoul: Ilsin co, 1977), 225-227.

⁷ Young-Ku Kim, <u>Yesterday and Today of ROK/US Military Command Relationships</u> (Seoul: JCS, 1993), 19.

This was an administrative commitment complementing the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty stating the command relationships after armistice as "this treaty includes issues concerning the continuous effort of the defense of Korea, US direct military aid for the enhancement of defense capability, and regulations on OPCON of the Korean troops, and this falls under the OPCON of UNC." Currently the procedure states: "OPCON can be changed under the agreement between two nations"

⁸ Mang-Sun Seo, <u>A Study of ROK/US Military Relationships and Operation Control</u>
Authority (Seoul: Dongkuk Univ. 1992), 69-70.

⁹ ROK JCS commanded and controlled the counter-infiltration operations when nK attempted to attack Chong Wa Dae, in addition, on the 1st of April, JCS took action to establish the reserve forces to take charge of counter-infiltration missions. But US was proactive and refused ROK's request on counter-nK retaliation. In the meanwhile, two day's latter, on 23 Jan. US Puebleau was kidnapped by nK. The US made rapid and active action to release the crew. US assumed a conciliatory attitude. They nearly surrendered to nK.

¹⁰ Joint communiqué issued by President Park Chung Hee Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Special Envoy of the President of the U.S.A., 15 Feb. 1968, Seoul and subsequently a Joint Communiqué by President Park Chung-Hee and President Lyndon B. Johnson was announced on 18 April 1968.

¹¹ Kwang-Woo Kim, <u>A Study of Development of ROK/US Military Cooperation</u> (Seoul: Kueongnam Univ. 1999), 36-38.

¹² Larry A. Niksch, <u>US troop Withdrawal from South Korea Past Shortcomings and Future</u>

<u>Prospects</u>, trans, Keong-Rak Choi, (Seoul: National Defense University, 1981), 10-15.

- ¹³ Bong-Hyeon Cho, <u>ROK/US Military Relationships on Operation Control Authority</u> (Seoul: National Defense University, 1977), 68-69.
- ¹⁴ JCS, <u>Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations</u>, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington D.C.: JCS, 2000), II-3-II-4.

"The President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and protecting military forces. In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risk involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE)."

¹⁵ MND, "Operation Control Authority in Peacetime and the Role of ROK Armed Forces," MND News, Vol. 94-14, (Seoul: MND, 1994), 3.

"The mission of the Eighth US Army is to provide forces to the CFC/USFK to deter aggression against the ROK and, should deterrence fail, to defeat that aggression."

¹⁶ ibid., 3-4.

¹⁷ The acronym "USFK" stands for United States Forces in Korea, a subordinate unified command of the US Pacific Command. Since essentially all US forces in Korea, except for a few assigned to the United Nations Command, are in USFK, the term is used in this paper to refer to US forces stationed in the Republic of Korea.

¹⁸ It includes 2nd ID, F-16s, A-10s, U-2s, and JSTARs etc.

¹⁹ Young-Bae Shin, "USFK-Operated Combat Equipment Valued At \$14 Bil." <u>Korea Herarld</u>, 26 January 2001, P.1.

²⁰ U.S. Department of the Army (DA), <u>Organization of the US Army</u>, DA Pamphlet 10-1, (Washington D.C.: DOA, 1994), 44.

- ²¹ MC consists of ROK CJCS, J-5 ROK JCS, US CJCS, CINCPACOM, and CINCCFC.
- ²² Combined Delegated Authority: Authority that maintain and prepare the deterrence and combat readiness in order to conduct Combined mission, planning and tasks during armistice.
 - ²³ Si-Yong Jung, "South-North Summit Talks," <u>Korea Times</u>, 11 June 2000, p.1.
- ²⁴ Doug Stuck, "South Korean Says North Wants US Troops to Stay," <u>Washington Post</u>, August 30, 2000, sec. 1A, p1.
- ²⁵ The White House, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999), 34.
 - ²⁶ William S. Cohen, Annual Report, 10-11.
- ²⁷ Sung-Han Kim, "the Korea-US Alliance and the U.S.F.K.: Searching for the New Roles", <u>Strategic Studies</u>, 14 February 1999, 193-196.

"The Korean Peninsula situation continues to change rapidly. The risks of unintended war exist due to a collapse in the North and peace will only be attained in Korea through interdialogue."

- ²⁸ Kwang-woo Kim, 70-71.
- ²⁹ Kwang-tae Kim, "NK Maintain Large-Scale Forward Deployment", <u>Korea Times</u>, December 5, 2000, p.1.
 - ³⁰ MND, The White Paper 2000, (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2000), 57-68.
- ³¹ Robert A Scalapino, <u>The Outlook for the Korean Peninsula: Impact and Influence of the Four Regional Powers</u>, Presentation to Center for Strategic and International Studies East Asia

Working Group, (Washington, DC, 18 November, 1998), cited in Taylor, Great Power Interests in Korean Unification.

³² William O. Odom, "The US Military in United Korea," <u>The Korean Journal of Defense</u> <u>Analysis</u> Vol. XII, no. 1 (2000): 13.

³³ ibid., 14.

³⁴ For detailed discussion of US military doctrine for multinational peace and humanitarian assistance operations, see the following Army field manuals, The Army in Multinational Operations, (FM) FM 100-8, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1997); Peace Operations, FM 100-23, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1994).

³⁵ Odom, 15-16.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bradner, Stephen. <u>North Korea's Strategy</u>. Seoul: Office of the Political Advisor, CINCUNC, 2000.

Cho, Bong-Hyeon. <u>ROK/US Military Relationships on Operation Control Authority</u>. Seoul: National Defense University, 1977.

Cohen, William S. <u>Annual Report to the President and Congress.</u> Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense, 2000.

Han, Young-won. <u>The Establishment and Role of ROK Armed Forces.</u> Seoul: Korea Univ., 1982.

Jung, Si-Yong. "South-North Summit Talks", Korea Times, 11 June 2000, p.1.

MND. Agreements of MND Book 1, Seoul: Committee of War History,1981.

MND. "Operation Control Authority in Peacetime and the Role of ROK Armed Forces," <u>MND News</u> Vol. 94-14, Seoul: MND, 1994.

MND. The White Paper 2000, Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2000.

Kim, Kwang-Woo. <u>A Study of Development of ROK/US Military Cooperation.</u> Seoul: Kueongnam Univ., 1999.

Kim, Kwang-tae. "NK Maintain Large-Scale Forward Deployment", Korea Times, December 5, 2000, p.1.

Kim, Sung-Han. "the Korea-US alliance and the U.S.F.K.: Searching for the New Roles", Strategic Studies, 1999.

Kim, Yang-Myeong. Korean War History. Seoul: Ilsin co, 1977.

Kim, Young-Ku. <u>Yesterday and Today of ROK/US Military Command Relationships.</u> Seoul: JCS, 1993.

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy, New York: A Touchstone Book Co.1994.

Niksch, Larry A. <u>US Troop Withdrawal from South Korea Past Shortcomings and Future Prospects</u>. Translated by Keong-Rak Choi. Seoul: NDU, 1981

Odom, William O. "The US Military in United Korea," <u>The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis</u> Vol. XII, no. 1, 2000, 7-28.

Scalpino, Robert A. <u>The Outlook for the Korean Peninsula: Impact and Influence of the Four Regional Powers</u>, Presentation to Center for Strategic and International Studies East Asia Working Group, Washington, DC, 1998.

U.S. Secretary of Defense. <u>2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula</u>. Washington, D.C.: OSD, 2000.

Seo, Mang-Sun. <u>A Study of ROK/US Military Relationships and Operation Control Authority.</u> Seoul: Dongkuk Univ., 1992.

Shin, Young-Bae. "USFK-Operated Combat Equipment Valued At \$14 Bil." Korea Hearld, 26 January 2001, P.1.

Stuck, Doug. "South Korean Says North Wants US Troops to Stay", <u>Washington Post</u>, August 30, 2000, sec. 1A, p.1.

The White House. <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century.</u> Washington, DC: government Printing Office, 1999.

- U.S. Department of the Army (DA). <u>Organization of the US Army.</u> DA Pamphlet 10-1, Washington D.C.: 1994.
- U.S. Department of the Army. <u>The Army in Multinational Operations</u>. FM 100-8, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997.
- U.S. Department of the Army. <u>Peace Operations</u>. FM 100-23, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). <u>Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations</u>; Joint Publication 3-16. Washington D.C.: JCS, 2000.